


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Der Lehrstuhl VWL 8 „Internationale Wettbewerbsökonomik“ bietet im Wintersemester 2020/21 ein *Mikrotheoretisches Seminar* für Bachelor-Studierende in den Studiengängen Economics, Internationale Wirtschaft und Entwicklung, Wirtschaftsmathematik und Philosophy & Economics zu dem Thema

WETTBEWERBSÖKONOMIK: GEWINNE AUF KOSTEN ANDERER?

an.

Firmen benutzen teils antikompetitive Strategien, um größere Profite zu erwirtschaften. Da dieses Vorgehen unter Umständen mit negativen Auswirkungen auf Wettbewerber und Konsumenten verbunden ist, treten häufig Wettbewerbsbehörden auf den Plan. Beispielsweise hat die EU-Kommission in den vergangenen Jahren Google wiederholt Geldstrafen im Milliardenbereich auferlegt. Indes erwägt der US-Kongress, ob Internetriesen wie Google, Amazon, Facebook und Apple zu mächtig geworden sind und in mehrere Teile zerschlagen werden sollten.

In diesem Seminar werden mikrotheoretische (spieltheoretische) Modelle betrachtet, die es erlauben, wettbewerbsverzerrendes Verhalten zu analysieren. Hierbei stellen sich Fragen wie: wann ziehen Firmen einen Nutzen aus vertikalen Fusionen, und wann ist eine Fusion zwischen nachgelagerten Unternehmen schädlich für Endverbraucher? Des Weiteren wird thematisiert, ob eine Zerschlagung Amazons in zwei Teile - in einen puren „*Online Marketplace*“ sowie in einen puren Einzelhändler - sich auf Konsumenten insgesamt positiv oder negativ auswirken würde.

Die behandelten industrieökonomischen Modelle verwenden Techniken der Spieltheorie. Daher ist eine vorherige erfolgreiche Teilnahme an der Veranstaltung „Markt und Wettbewerb“, „Wettbewerbstheorie und -politik“, oder „Spieltheorie“ hilfreich, aber nicht zwingend erforderlich.

Es stehen insgesamt 20 Seminarplätze zur Verfügung. Übersteigt die Anzahl der Interessenten die verfügbaren Seminarplätze, so werden die Seminarplätze nach der Reihenfolge der Anmeldungen vergeben. Die **Seminarleistung** besteht aus einer **Seminararbeit** (10 - 12 Seiten) und einem **Vortrag** (inklusive Foliensatz) der eigenen Arbeit sowie in der Beteiligung an der allgemeinen Diskussion. Die Seminarnote ergibt sich als gewichtetes Mittel aus den Leistungen wie folgt: 70% Hausarbeit und 30% Vortrag und Beteiligung an der Diskussion.

- Bachelor-Studierende aus dem Studiengang *Philosophy & Economics* können das Seminar im E6/Ö6-Bereich (5 LP) anrechnen.
- *Economics*-Bachelor-Studierende können das Seminar als „Seminar zu Institution und Governance“, „Mikrotherotisches Seminar“ oder im „Individuellen Schwerpunkt“ anrechnen (5LP, neue PO). Gemäß alter PO kann das Seminar als „GVWL 2-Seminar“ (GVWL II 5 oder GVWL II 6) eingebracht werden (5 LP).
- *IWE*-Studierende können das Seminar im „Individuellen Schwerpunkt“ (Spezialisierung IGME oder VET) anrechnen (5 LP) oder als „Seminar zur internationalen Wirtschaft“ (5 LP).

Seminaranmeldung:

Um sich für das Seminar anzumelden, melden Sie sich bitte in dem entsprechenden CAMPUSonline-Kurs an, und schreiben folgende Email: (folgen Sie bitte exakt den nachfolgenden Anweisungen)

1. Schreiben Sie eine E-Mail an a.kadner-graziano@uni-bayreuth.de und in Carbon Copy (cc) maximilian.kaehny@uni-bayreuth.de
2. Die E-Mail sollte folgenden Inhalt haben:
 - a. *Betreff*: Seminar-IÖ
 - b. *Inhalt*: Bitte geben Sie folgende Information als eine durch Kommata abgetrennte Liste (ohne Leerzeichen) an: (Ohne weitere Details, wie z.B. Lieber Herr Kadner-Graziano)

Nachname, Vorname, Mat-Nr., Studiengang, Modul, Email-Adresse, Thema_1, Thema_2, Thema_3

Modul bezeichnet den Bereich in dem Sie das Seminar anrechnen lassen wollen. Z.B. IS (Individueller Schwerpunkt), IW (Seminar Internationale Wirtschaft).

Thema_1 bezeichnet das Thema welches Sie am liebsten bearbeiten möchten. Geben Sie bitte auf jeden Fall drei Themenwünsche an.

Beispiel:

Kähny, Maximilian, 1478249, Econ, GVWL-2, maximilian.kaehny@uni-bayreuth.de, 8, 4, 10

Die Zuteilung der Themen erfolgt am **Montag den 16. November 2020**. Sie werden per Email über die Annahme zum Seminar und die Themenzuteilung benachrichtigt. Die Seminaranmeldung gilt ab diesem Tag als **verbindlich**. Die **Seminaranmeldung** ist ab sofort möglich.

Organisatorisches/ Termine:

- Vorbesprechung: **Mittwoch 4. November 2020, 9:30 Uhr** Uhr, via ZOOM (Link wird im eLearning bereitgestellt)
- Anmeldeschluss: **Sonntag 15. November 2020**
- Blockseminar: Freitag und Samstag, **15. und 16. Januar 2021** (9-18 Uhr)
- Ort: Wahrscheinlich via ZOOM (falls doch möglich, klassisch auf dem Campus)
- Abgabe der Seminararbeit: **Montag 1. Februar 2021** (gedruckt und per E-Mail als ein PDF-Dokument)
- Ansprechpartner: Alessandro Kadner-Graziano M. Phil. oder Maximilian Kähny M. Sc. (a.kadner-graziano@uni-bayreuth.de, maximilian.kaehny@uni-bayreuth.de)
- Vortragssprache: deutsch
- Leitfaden zum Erstellen einer wissenschaftlichen Arbeit: https://www.icp.uni-bayreuth.de/en/teaching/BA_MA_WiwiZ-Theses/index.html

Lehrbücher zu den Themenkomplexen

- **Competition Policy: Theory and Practice**, Massimo Motta, Cambridge University Press, 2004. (Insbesondere Kapitel 6.)
- **Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies**, Paul Belleflamme und Martin Peitz, Cambridge University Press, 2010. (Insbesondere Kapitel 17.)

Themen

In dem Seminar werden **fünf Themenblöcke** besprochen:

- a) Analyse vertikaler Marktstrukturen
- b) Profitabilität vertikaler Fusionen
- c) Strategien von Onlineplattformen
- d) Marktabstottung durch Preisstrategien
- e) „Productivity Paradox“

Weitere Themen können auf Anfrage vergeben werden.

a) Analyse vertikaler Marktstrukturen

1. Moresi, S. und Schwartz, M. (2017): “Strategic incentives when supplying to rivals with an application to vertical firm structure”, *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, **51**: 137-161.

“We consider a vertically integrated input monopolist supplying to a differentiated downstream rival. With linear input pricing, at the margin the firm unambiguously wants the rival to expand—unlike standard oligopoly with no supply relationship—for either Cournot or Bertrand competition. With a two-part tariff for the input, the same result holds if downstream choices are strategic complements, but is reversed for Cournot with strategic substitutes. We analyze vertical delegation as one mechanism for inducing expansion or contraction by the rival/customer.”

2. Bourreau, M., Hombert, J., Pouyet, J. und Schulz, N. (2011): “Upstream Competition between Integrated Firms”, *The Journal of Industrial Economics*, **59**: 677-713.

“We propose a model of two-tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms. We show that, even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input, the Bertrand logic may collapse, and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium. These partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce or when unintegrated downstream competitors are relatively inefficient. We discuss the impact of several regulatory tools on the competitiveness of the wholesale market.”

3. Wirl, F. (2015): "Downstream and upstream oligopolies when retailer's effort matters", *Journal of Economics*, **116**: 99-127.

"This paper investigates the different terms of strategic interactions (non-cooperative, simultaneous move): wholesale versus retail pricing - between Bertrand competing retailers and an upstream oligopoly. The crucial extension is that retailers can play a significant role and this can turn conventional wisdom upside down, e.g.: retail competition need not benefit the upstream firms and wholesale pricing can dominate retail pricing in spite of double marginalization because of the incentives it provides to retailers. In addition, the consequences are investigated of differentiating both pricing instruments either at the downstream (this is motivated by Apple's entry into the ebook market) or at the upstream level."

b) Profitabilität vertikaler Fusionen

4. Ordober, J., Saloner, G. und Salop, S. (1990): "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure", *The American Economic Review*, **80**: 127-142.

"We formulate a complete, but analytically simple, equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims. The model includes incentives of the integrated firm and unintegrated input suppliers to exclude rivals, the potential counter-strategies of competitors to these foreclosure threats, and the potential hold-out problem. In this fully specified model, vertical foreclosure can emerge in equilibrium."

5. Zanchettin, P. und Mukherjee, A. (2017): "Vertical integration and product differentiation", *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, **55**: 25-57.

"We study a new channel of downstream rent extraction through vertical integration: competition for integration. Innovative downstream firms create value and profit opportunities through product differentiation, which however affects an upstream monopolist's incentive to vertically integrate. By playing the downstream firms against each other for integration, the upstream firm can extract even more than the additional profits generated by the downstream firms' differentiation activities. To preempt rent extraction, the downstream firms may then reduce differentiation, which reduces social welfare. We show that this social cost of vertical integration is more likely to arise in innovative and competitive industries, and that the competition for integration channel of downstream rent extraction is robust to upstream competition."

c) Strategien von Onlineplattformen

6. Jullien, B., Reisinger, M. und Rey, P. (2017): "Vertical Foreclosure and Multi-Segment Competition", *Working Paper*, Toulouse School of Economics.

"This paper analyzes a supplier's incentives to foreclose downstream entry when entrants have stronger positions in different market segments, thus bringing added value as well as competition. We first consider the case where wholesale contracts take the form of linear tariffs, and characterize the conditions under which the competition-intensifying effect dominates, thereby leading to foreclosure. We then show that foreclosure can still occur with non-linear tariffs, even coupled with additional provisions such as resale price maintenance."

7. Hagiu, A., The, T. und Wright, J. (2020): "Should Amazon be allowed to sell on its own marketplace?", mimeo, Boston University.

"A growing number of platforms such as those run by Amazon, Apple and Google operate in a dual mode: running marketplaces, at the same time as selling products on them. We build a model to explore the implications of this controversial practice. We show that while banning the dual mode benefits third-party sellers, it often results in lower consumer surplus or total welfare, even after allowing for innovation by third-party sellers, and imitation and self-preferencing by the platform. Instead, policies that prevent platform imitation and self-preferencing always lead to better outcomes than an outright ban on the dual mode."

8. Etro, F. (2020). "Product selection in online marketplaces." *SSRN Working Paper* 3641307.

"A marketplace such as Amazon hosts a variety of products by third party sellers and acts as a first party or private label retailer. Assuming an advantage of Amazon in logistics and of sellers in marketing, we investigate whether entry by Amazon is excessive from the point of view of consumers (as through self-preferencing to win the Featured Offer position or promote its own products). With competitive sellers, entry may be either over-provided or under-provided, but the incentives of Amazon and consumers are correctly aligned for a family of power surplus functions (generating for instance linear, isoelastic and log-linear demands). Platform competition for customers reduces commissions and prices preserving the efficiency result. Market power by sellers increases (reduces) the incentives to retail private label (first party) products, and generates a bias toward under-provision of entry. We also study issues related to delivery fulfillment by Amazon, advertising and dynamic incentives to launch products on the platform."

9. Foro, Ø., Kind, H.J. und Shaffer, G. (2017): "Apple's agency model and the role of most-favored-nation clauses", *The RAND Journal of Economics*, **48**: 673-703.

"The agency model used by Apple and other digital platforms delegates retail-pricing decisions to upstream content providers subject to a fixed revenue-sharing rule. Given competition both upstream and downstream, we consider how, under the agency model, retail prices depend on the firms' revenue-sharing splits and the degrees to which consumers view the platforms and the goods sold on the platforms to be substitutes. We show that the agency model may not be universally adopted even if adoption would mean higher profits for all firms. Use of most-favored-nation clauses in these settings can ensure industry-wide adoption and increase retail prices."

d) Marktabstottung durch Preisstrategien

10. Chao, Y., Tan, G. und Wong, A. (2018): "All-unit discounts as a partial foreclosure device", *The RAND Journal of Economics*, **49**: 155-180.

"We investigate the strategic effects of all-units discounts (AUDs) used by a dominant firm in the presence of a capacity-constrained rival. Due to the limited capacity of the rival, the dominant firm has a captive portion of the buyer's demand for the single product. As compared to linear pricing, the dominant firm can use AUDs to go beyond its captive portion by tying its captive demand with part of the competitive demand and partially foreclose its small rival. When the rival's capacity level is well below relevant demand, AUDs reduce the buyer's surplus."

11. Fees, E. und Wohlschlegel, A. (2010): "All-unit discounts and the problem of surplus division", *Review of Industrial Organisation*, **37**: 161-178.

"All-unit discounts (AUD) are non-linear pricing schemes whereby buyers who reach a specific quantity threshold get rebates also retroactively for all units bought before. This sets high incentives for buyers to meet the quantity threshold, and may also have foreclosure effects on potential entrants. In a model where an incumbent faces second-period competition by entrants, we show that AUD can indeed be abused to shift rents from entrants. In contrast to exclusive dealing which is usually seen as very similar to AUD, inefficient quantity distortions may arise even with perfect information if and only if there is sufficiently intense competition among potential entrants."

12. Amelio, A., Giardino-Karlinger, L. und Valletti (2020): "Exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets", *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 102592.

"This paper studies the incentives to engage in exclusionary pricing in the context of two-sided markets. Platforms are horizontally differentiated, and seek to attract users of two groups who single-home and enjoy indirect network externalities from the size of the opposite user group active on the same platform. The entrant incurs a fixed cost of entry, and the incumbent can commit to its prices before the entry decision is taken. The incumbent has thus the option to either accommodate entry, or to exclude entry and enjoy monopolistic profits, albeit under the constraint that its price must be low enough to not leave any room for an entrant to cover its fixed cost of entry. We find that, in the spirit of the literature on limit pricing, under certain circumstances even platforms find it profitable to exclude entrants if the fixed entry cost lies above a certain threshold. By studying the properties of the threshold, we show that the stronger the network externality, the lower the thresholds for which incumbent platforms find it profitable to exclude. We also find that entry deterrence is more likely to harm consumers the weaker are network externalities, and the more differentiated are the two platforms."

e) „Productivity Paradox“

13. Belleflamme, P. (2001): "Oligopolistic competition, IT use for product differentiation and the productivity paradox", *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, **19**: 227-248.

"Empirical studies suggest that the huge investment in information technologies (IT) of the past two decades has led to no significant increase in productivity; this phenomenon is known as the 'productivity paradox'. It has been argued that the paradox might result from oligopolistic competition: because of strategic interaction, each individual firm might find it profitable to invest in cost-reducing IT, but total investment might then be excessive from the industry's point of view. I confirm this view and strengthen it by allowing IT investment to be also devoted to product differentiation which makes the productivity paradox more likely. The emergence of Web-based electronic commerce provides an illustration of the forces identified in the model."